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
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
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AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

STUDENT REPORT

TERRORISM: AMERICAN CONCERNS

MAJOR HAROLD L. KORNTVED 87-1490

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REPORT NUMBER 87-1490

TITLE "TERRORISM: AMERICAN CONCERNS"

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SPONSOR COLONEL CALVIN R. JOHNSON, AWC/NP

Submitted to the faculty in partial fulfillment of
requirements for graduation.

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
AIR UNIVERSITY
MAXWELL AFB, AL 36112

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED			1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS		
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY			3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT STATEMENT "A" Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited.		
2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE					
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) 87-1490			5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)		
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION ACSC/EDCC		6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)		7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION	
6c. ADDRESS (City, State and ZIP Code) Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5542				7b. ADDRESS (City, State and ZIP Code)	
8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION		8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)		9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER	
8c. ADDRESS (City, State and ZIP Code)				10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NOS.	
				PROGRAM ELEMENT NO. PROJECT NO. TASK NO. WORK UNIT NO.	
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) "TERRORISM: AMERICAN CONCERNS"					
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Korntved, Harold L., Major, USAF					
13a. TYPE OF REPORT		13b. TIME COVERED FROM _____ TO _____		14. DATE OF REPORT (Yr., Mo., Day) 1987 APRIL	
15. PAGE COUNT 40					
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION					
17. COSATI CODES FIELD GROUP SUB GR			18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)		
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) → This research analysis evaluates and discusses the apparent concerns of three separate audiences regarding terrorism in the United States, or against our personnel or property overseas. The three audiences include the high school student, college students, and the senior military member. ←					
20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED <input type="checkbox"/> SAME AS RPT. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OTIC USERS <input type="checkbox"/>				21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL ACSC/EDCC Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5542				22b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) (205)-293-2483	
				22c. OFFICE SYMBOL	

PREFACE

Almost daily, we read or hear the accounts of another terrorist incident some place in the world. Usually these incidents take place in a location considered remote from the United States. Despite that however, Americans are becoming more concerned regarding the actions and methods of terrorists and terrorist organizations. Consequently, the purpose of this study is to analyze how American audiences would react to increased terrorist attacks, possibly against US persons/resources or within the contiguous United States.

This study is a brief analysis of American concerns. It explores the terrorist issue by developing questions the public, at the high school and college level, is apt to ask. Questions were also developed that senior military members are likely to ask. Finally, answers to these questions were researched and properly documented responses provided. These responses reflect various official points of view and policy statements.

There are, obviously, many American concerns that are not addressed in this study. Terrorism and this nation's reaction/response to it are dynamic phenomena. A high priority concern today can be easily subordinated by a more spectacular terrorist action tomorrow.

This research analysis was developed in response to a request by the National Security Briefing Team. The analysis, and proposed briefing scripts (Appendices), were provided for incorporation into their program.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A special thanks to the project sponsor, Col Calvin Johnson, Air War College. His interest and guidance ensured the project got started in the right direction. A thank-you belongs to the Air Command and Staff College advisor, Major Patrick Evans, for his guidance and thoughts during the entire project. Finally, a very special thanks to Ms Jane E. Gibish, Air University Library, for consistently keeping me apprised of the latest, most up-to-date correspondence dealing with terrorism.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Major Harold L. Korntved graduated from the University of Wisconsin, in May 1974, with a bachelor's degree in mechanical engineering. He subsequently completed Officers Training School (OTS) in November of that same year. After two base level civil engineering assignments, he attended the Florida Institute of Technology where he was awarded his master's degree (1980) in systems management.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface	iii	
About the Author	iv	
Table of Contents	v	
Executive Summary	vi	
CHAPTER ONE -- INTRODUCTION		
Background of the Problem	1	
Significance of the Problem	1	
Assumptions and Limitations	2	
Objective of the Study	2	
CHAPTER TWO -- HIGH SCHOOL AUDIENCE		
Could it Happen Here?	3	
Why Hasn't it Happened Here?	4	
Media Giving too Much Coverage?	4	
Is Terrorism Effective?	5	
How do Nations Support Terrorism?	6	
CHAPTER THREE -- COLLEGE AUDIENCE		
Reagan's Goal in Treating Terrorism and Libya?	8	
Reagan's Goal in Treating Terrorism and Syria?	9	
Americans Out of Libya: Was it Legal?	10	
In Bombing Libya, Did We Become Terrorists?	10	
Is U.S. Retaliation Morally Right?	11	
CHAPTER FOUR -- MILITARY AUDIENCE		
Does U.S. Anti/Counter-Terrorism Program Have Any International Support?	14	
What Are U.S. Options to Combat Terrorism Abroad?	15	
What's the Status of Our Counterterrorism Forces?	17	
CHAPTER FIVE -- CONCLUSION		19
BIBLIOGRAPHY		21
APPENDICES -- BRIEFING SCRIPTS		
Appendix A -- High School Audience	25	
Appendix B -- College Audience	28	
Appendix C -- Senior Military Audience	31	

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



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REPORT NUMBER 87-1490

AUTHOR(S) MAJOR HAROLD L. KORNTVED, USAF

TITLE TERRORISM: AMERICAN CONCERNS

I. Purpose: To research and provide the National Security Briefing Team with an analysis of how American audiences would react to increased terrorist attacks, possibly against U.S. persons/resources or within the contiguous United States. The analysis and briefing scripts were developed for incorporation into the briefing/self-study program of the National Security Briefing Team.

II. Problem: Research and develop a series of questions, regarding terrorism, reflecting questions the public, at the high school and college level, is apt to ask. Develop the same sort of questions senior military members are likely to ask. Develop answers to these questions, reflecting proper points of view and policy statements. Finally, provide attachments to the paper containing three suggested briefing scripts, one for each audience.

III. Data: Chapter One contains a brief explanation of the background and significance of terrorism. It also includes a short paragraph regarding the assumptions and limitations in developing the particular questions that each separate audience is likely to ask. Chapter Two addresses the five issues that appear to be concerns of the high school audience. A briefing script (Appendix A) was prepared from that discussion. In Chapter Three, the college audience questioned the legality and

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morality of this nation's response to terrorism. From the discussion of their five questions, another short briefing script (Appendix B) was prepared for use in presenting terrorist issues to the college audience. The final briefing script (Appendix C) was prepared from the issues and concerns of the military audience, which are presented in Chapter Four.

IV. Conclusion: Americans, across the board, have some deep-riding concerns regarding terrorism. The exact nature of their questions may be different, but individuals from high school, college, and the military all have personal concerns of one sort or another. Some of these concerns were explored. There are, obviously, many that were not. Additionally, terrorism and this nation's reaction/response to it is certainly a very dynamic situation. A priority issue today can very easily be subordinated by a more spectacular terrorist act tomorrow.

Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

There is a general concern in this country regarding terrorism. It extends, in varying degrees, from Congress and the Executive Branch to the grass-roots of America. Not only are our policy makers struggling to find answers, but college and high school students are also seeking them. Questions are being raised regarding increased terrorist attacks, possibly against U.S. persons/resources abroad or within the contiguous United States.

BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM

Terrorism is not a new and unprecedented phenomenon. "It is as old as the hills, only the manifestations of terror have changed. The present epidemic is mild compared with previous outbreaks. There were more assassinations of leading statesmen in the 1890s in both America and Europe, when terrorism had more supporters, than at the present time." (15:51) Today's terrorism, however, differs in its extent and its violence; it now attacks the territory and citizens of nearly all the democracies. (19:49) The United States of course has not been exempt from these attacks. As a matter of fact, "for the past decade U.S. citizens and installations have been far and away the number one target for terrorists abroad." (11:1)

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM

Since 1969, terrorists have killed or maimed more than 1,000 of our countrymen and during the past decade terrorist acts directed against U.S. government officials and installations abroad have averaged one every 17 days. In fact, since 1968, almost 50 percent of international terrorist incidents have been directed against U.S. interests. Throughout the world, U.S. businessmen, public servants, military personnel, educators, and churchmen are targets of terrorist violence. (16:11)

Why is that? Why do Americans seem to be perfect targets for terrorist attacks? There are five reasons. (16:11-12) First, the U.S. and its allies pursue gradual and peaceful change; terrorists are fanatical and advocate radical change. Second, the "open" democratic society is much more prone to terrorist intimidations. Third, U.S. citizens (and interests) can be found all over the world and consequently, if for no other

reason than sheer numbers, run greater overall risks. Fourth, U.S. intelligence, sorely needed in combating terrorism, has not recovered the prestige (and resultant effectiveness) it lost in the late 1970s. Finally, and probably the most important, the U.S. lacks a consistent, effective, and realistic policy of response. When these five factors are considered collectively, it becomes easier to understand why Americans are frequent targets of terrorist attacks.

ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

There are some assumptions/limitations in developing the questions that three separate audiences are likely to ask. While there is no lack of documented American concerns regarding terrorism, available sources do not clearly delineate to which audience that particular issue is pertinent. Consequently, personal opinion was generally used in establishing the relationship of issue and audience. For the most part, questions were attributed to audiences based upon the nature of the specific concern and the particular publication being researched (i.e., questions of a generic nature were attributed to the high school audience; concerns expressed in Scholastic Update were attributed to the college level audience; issues regarding the possibility of a military response were attributed to the senior military audience, etc.).

OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

The primary purpose of this study is to research and develop questions and answers, relative to the problem statement, that individuals from the following three separate audiences might ask: high school level, college level, and senior military level. The research analysis, and accompanying scripts, were requested by the National Security Briefing Team, the sponsor of this project. This product was developed to provide a useful input for the Team--either as actual briefing scripts or as part of the their self-study program.

Chapter Two

HIGH SCHOOL AUDIENCE

Terrorism is disturbing not just emotionally and morally but intellectually, as well. (22:62) News about bombings, hostages, and kidnappings appear on our televisions almost daily. That constant barrage about terrorist activities is being heard by this nation's young people. How do they view terrorism? What are their questions and concerns regarding terrorism? This chapter will explore their concerns by developing a series of questions and answers that the high school level audience is apt to ask.

So far, the U.S. has not been the target of a major terrorist attack (similar to the ones conducted overseas). However, terrorism still seems to be on the minds of many Americans, particularly high school juniors/seniors, and gives rise to the first question.

COULD IT HAPPEN HERE?

Many people think so. Security experts warn that extremists could find easy pickings in many American cities. (3:27) "We are absolutely unprepared here in the U.S.," says Dr Robert Kupperman, a terrorism expert at Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies and a former National Security Council staffer. (3:27) A U.S. intelligence analyst concurs: "We have become the ultimate challenge for every terrorist, and we are just not ready." (3:27)

There are many anti-terrorism programs in existence in the U.S.--some at the national level (FBI, FAA, Border Patrol, etc.) and others at the local level, such as many major cities (Newark, Chicago, Boston, Washington DC, Los Angeles). Despite all these programs, however, concern still persists that the U.S. has not done enough. (9:21) "Our telecommunications and industrial infrastructure--such as oil pipelines and electrical power grids--are extremely vulnerable," declares Dr Kupperman. (9:21) Neil Livingston of the Institute on Terrorism and Subnational Conflict in Washington, also indicated "a few people who know how systems work could inflict a tremendous amount of damage." Calling techniques such as poisoning an area's water supply "the poor man's atomic bomb," he further stated that 70 such incidents have occurred around the world. (9:21) National and local officials are working to correct some of the problems with our present programs--including a substantial increase in physical security. Most experts argue, however, that building a "fortress America" would

in itself be a surrender to terrorism. (9:21) "There are ways to make this a safe country, but I wouldn't want to live in it," says Frank Brittell of Business Risks International, a firm based in California. (9:21) This observation, however, is challenged by the Bureau. "The rising concern for terrorism [in the United States] outdistances the reality," says FBI director William Webster. (20:20)

The second question comes out of the discussion surrounding the concern of whether terrorism could happen here. Our anti-terrorism programs do have some problems; we have a very large free and open (democratic) society, and our security efforts don't always seem to be properly conducted. (For example, diffusion of responsibility is a worrisome factor. In the case of an aircraft hijacking, the FBI has jurisdiction if the plane is on the ground and the door is open, but the FAA is in charge otherwise.) (9:21) With this background in mind, the next question seems to be why we've been lucky this long.

WHY HASN'T IT HAPPENED HERE?

Stopping terrorists from striking inside the U.S. is no easy task. Here, our society's greatest strength--its openness--leaves it dangerously vulnerable to sabotage. Security specialists worry about skimpy security at the nation's public buildings, military bases, power stations, and water supplies. (2:21) What's more, it is virtually impossible for the FBI to keep track of the multitude of foreign visitors to the country, and it only takes one person to plant a bomb. Then why has the U.S. seemed to have escaped the terrorist problem we associate with Europe? For one thing, the nation's location helps. Potential terrorists from the Middle East, for instance, must travel far from their bases and supply networks to carry out attacks here. (2:21) For another thing, experts say, foreign extremists find few supporters in the U.S. (2:21) Still another reason is that political and ethnic squabbles in the U.S. rarely drive Americans to react through terrorist violence. (2:21) U.S. officials also credit the FBI's stepped up efforts to stop terrorist groups (since being designated the "lead agency" in our fight against domestic terrorism, the Bureau devotes 500 of its 9000 agents to combatting terrorism). (2:21) Despite overall praise for the FBI's counterterrorism efforts, some U.S. lawmakers still see room for improvement. Joel Lisker, chief council for the Security and Terrorism panel of the Senate Judiciary Committee, points to doubts about the Bureau's ability to analyze information and penetrate pro-Libyan and pro-Iranian groups. (2:22)

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, there is a steady barrage of terrorist activities in our news media. That fact gives rise to the next question.

IS THE NEWS MEDIA GIVING TERRORISM TOO MUCH COVERAGE?

The first step in the terrorist strategy is to make

outsiders aware of their existence. To ensure our awareness, terrorists must gain and hold our attention. (6:17) Modern terrorists seek access to the media by committing acts that closely fit news agencies' definitions of news: being timely and unique, involving adventure or having entertainment value, and somehow affecting the lives of those being informed of them. (6:14) As Professor Walter Laquer put it, "the media are a terrorist's best friend, the terrorist act by itself is nothing, publicity is all." (15:52) Put yet another way, Benjamin Netanyahu (a former soldier, businessman, editor of "Terrorism," and Israel's Ambassador to the United Nations) states:

Access to media is indispensable. First the terrorists seize our attention by committing a brutal act. Only then does the real performance begin: communiques, parading dazed hostages before cameras, the endless interviews in which the terrorists are respectfully asked to explain their demands and conditions. Slowly, imperceptibly, the initial horror recedes, and in its place comes a readiness to accept the terrorist point of view. (19:48)

Knowing this, how does the public rate the news media and their coverage of terrorism? The American public thinks the news media may be giving terrorists too much coverage, and 6 in 10 say this increases the chance that terrorist acts will be repeated. (10:74) In a new poll conducted by the Gallup Organization for Times Mirror, the Los Angeles-based media company, 51 percent said the press gives too much coverage to terrorist incidents, and some 56 percent say terrorists are given too much opportunity to promote their causes. (10:74) Asked why the press sometimes fails to do a good job covering terrorism, most Americans (68%) put the blame on competition between news organizations and newspeople. But 77% also said that terrorist incidents would occur even if news media did not cover them so extensively. (10:74) If (as the above statistic seems to indicate) Americans believe the occurrence of terrorist attacks are not dependent upon the news media, why do they occur? Do they accomplish/achieve their intended purpose? High school students appear to want to know.

IS TERRORISM EFFECTIVE?

Terrorism has not succeeded in creating a climate of repression in Western nations because terrorists have failed to create sufficient fear, and the authorities have not responded by enacting repressive measures. (6:20) The terrorists' belief that fear can be produced has some foundation. But, perhaps because their ideology demands it, terrorists seem unable to accept the fact that the responses of a government may actually reflect the desires of the people. Since greater fear produces greater willingness to rely on authority, the public will not likely be alienated by reasonable responses from officials. (6:20) Thus, terrorists will not succeed unless they provoke the authorities into taking actions contrary to popular will. (6:20)

That is a contributing reason to why terrorism is not a widespread U.S. phenomena. Even our outright military strike on Libya, and the President's statements regarding terrorism and Syria/Iran and our possible military action towards those countries, drew popular support. It should be noted that immediately after the Libyan raid, a public opinion roundup indicated: 65% of the public felt we should have attacked Libya and 82% believed our level of strike was the right amount or it should have been larger; 69% of the people approved of military action against Syria or Iran if links to terrorist acts against Americans can be proven; finally, 64% felt Reagan was not taking too many risks in the situation with Libya. (5:27)

The final question (from the high school audience) refers to how terrorism is supported by the various states/organizations. Actual details surrounding what appear to be state sponsored terrorist acts are unclear at times. However, much is known about the various methods nations do use to support terrorism.

HOW DO NATIONS SUPPORT TERRORISM?

In December 1985, in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the Rome and Vienna airports, the police discovered one of the terrorists was carrying a Tunisian passport. In itself, that is strange--even worse, it was determined that the passport in question had been confiscated by Libyan authorities (in August) from a Tunisian worker expelled from Libya. (13:12) The implication, and probable scenario, is that Libya provided the false passport documentation that enabled the terrorist group to conduct its attacks on the airports. That example, according to Francois Le Mouel, head of antiterrorist operations for France's National Police, is an exception proving the rule. (13:12) Usually, he says, it is much more difficult to find evidence of state support for specific terrorist operations. How else do nations support terrorist operations? Over the past several years, intelligence systems have gathered enough information to allow some fairly firm conclusions. Several of these methods of support are detailed in the following paragraphs. (13:12)

Money. It is one of the easiest forms of support. Libya, for example, is a nation that has substantial amounts of revenue from its oil industry. It is also known to have supplied millions of dollars to Palestinian, Latin American, and European terrorist groups. The USSR too, is known to funnel vast quantities of funds through East European and other clients such as Syria, Cuba, and Nicaragua. The money comes in forms of pay-offs from nations wishing to protect themselves from attack. Some terrorist leaders are known to lead elegant lives. Also, according to Israeli sources, Syria paid an Arab student in Rome to provide details on the layout of the El Al airline office, presumably in preparation for an attack. (13:13)

Training. Nations sponsoring terrorism also provide training in such areas as weaponry, explosives, methods of assassination, paramilitary tactics, and intelligence gathering

and analysis. A report prepared last summer for the Senate Judiciary Committee noted some 2000 terrorists from 20 countries had been trained in camps (staffed by Cuban, Libyan, and PLO personnel) in Iran and Nicaragua. There are other examples as well, including widespread reports of terrorists being trained in the USSR and East European countries. (13:13)

Weapons. In addition to money to purchase weapons, state sponsors also provide arms directly. When the Cyprus-registered steamer *Claudia* was captured by the Irish off the coast of Ireland in 1973, it was carrying five tons of weapons from Libya to IRA terrorists--most of the weapons were of Soviet-bloc manufacture. (13:13)

Support from Embassies and Safe Houses. Nicaragua, for example, is said to be playing host to terrorists belonging to the PLO. Once outside their countries, terrorists need places to hide and communication contacts. State sponsors often provide these through diplomatic facilities--clearly not according to the principles of international law. (13:13)

State sponsors provide support in other ways too. Intelligence services are used to support terrorist activities. Space for their facilities is often provided in various locations near perspective target areas. Significant encouragement for terrorism is provided by leaders of support countries (i.e. the outspoken rhetoric of Colonel Qaddafi). (13:13) All these factors serve to support terrorism either morally or physically.

Having just explored the concerns and questions apt to be raised by the high school audience, it is now time to discuss the concerns of the college level audience. That will be the topic of the next chapter.

Chapter Three

COLLEGE AUDIENCE

Over the past several years, the U.S. has charged Libya (and the regime of Colonel Qaddafi) with various state sponsored terrorist activities. However, the U.S. track record in its dealings with Third World states like Libya has been poor. (8:886) Specifically, Qaddafi had long ago drawn the ire of U.S. leaders for a host of actions unrelated to state-sponsored terrorism: the closing of U.S. bases in his country, the expansion of controls on U.S. oil companies in Libya, the implementation of a version of Islamic socialism, Qaddafi's boisterous endorsement and financing of most radical Palestinian groups, his tireless propagation of anti-Western attitudes in the Third World, and his intervention in neighboring states to topple moderate (Western-oriented) heads of state. (8:886) Bearing this in mind, people seem to be asking what has President Reagan been trying to achieve in his treatment of Qaddafi.

WHAT IS PRESIDENT REAGAN'S GOAL IN HIS TREATMENT OF TERRORISM AND LIBYA (MUAMMAR QADDAFI)?

The President's goal is to isolate Qaddafi, strengthen the dictator's opponents within Libya--and clear the way for a U.S. military strike should Qaddafi be reckless enough to provide cause for attack. (1:16) The main architect for this plan was Donald Fortier, the No. 2 official on the National Security Council Staff. The order of battle follows.

Put Qaddafi on the spot internationally. Create a climate in which citizens of the U.S., Western Europe, and even much of the Arab world can support--or at least condone--U.S. military action against Libya. (1:16)

Keep pressing the allies. If countries like Belgium, France, and Italy continue to sell military supplies to Libya, they could find their U.S. military deals interrupted. Countries refusing to cut off air traffic to Libya and impose "onerous" security measures might have their passengers on their flights to the U.S. subjected to that kind of harassment. (1:16)

Turn the oil weapon back on Libya. Use the administration's economic muscle to complicate the already serious economic and political problems caused by the oil glut and Qaddafi's own erratic leadership. (1:16)

Boost Qaddafi's enemies. The President and his advisers agreed to press ahead with a four-year-old CIA program to

identify, finance, and encourage Qaddafi's enemies within Libya, neighboring countries, and within the Libya exile community. (1:16)

There are other items in Fortier's plan, but all are intended to ultimately clear the way and garner support for an attack on Libyan terrorism targets by the U.S. military.

It is at this juncture that scholars and college students appear to come face to face with a real dilemma. There has been much media coverage of not only Libyan sponsorship of terrorism, but Syrian as well. That being the case, the college audience wonders, why does the U.S. not appear to have a hard, strong, anti-terrorism program aimed at Syria (similar to the one just discussed concerning Libya).

WHAT IS PRESIDENT REAGAN'S GOAL IN HIS TREATMENT OF TERRORISM AND SYRIA (HAFEZ ASSAD)?

Syria directs or supports terrorist activity through its own organizations and, increasingly, with aid to radical Palestinian and Shiite groups--waging war by proxy for political ends. Experts have linked Syria to dozens of incidents. (7:26) For years Qaddafi has been the international outlaw. However, it is now clear that Qaddafi is "an erratic bumbler compared with Assad, a hard eyed strategist who uses terror as an essential tool of statecraft." (7:26) The resulting dilemma for the U.S. and its allies makes the development of an effective anti-terrorism policy extremely difficult. Can Assad be caught and dealt a blow like Qaddafi? The answer is not at all clear. "With Qaddafi," says Brian Jenkins, director of the Rand Corporation's research on political violence, "you wind up watching his lips. With Assad, you better keep an eye on his hands." (7:26) Says Ariel Merari, director of Tel Aviv University's Project on Terrorism: "There is no doubt that the general policy of sponsoring terrorist activity in Western Europe is done with Assad's approval and probably his initiative." (7:27)

If the evidence is clear and substantial, then why isn't anything being done? London has broken relations and is pressing for action by others. The U.S. and Canada have complied by pulling out their ambassadors while maintaining formal ties. But others (France, West Germany, Greece) seem reluctant to act. (7:27) In other words, there is no concerted effort on the part of the West. Reagan's warning to terrorists that "you can run, but you can't hide" seems hollow. Especially when Washington has all but ruled out a military option. (7:27) (It is virtually out of the question because of Syria's air defenses--best outside the Soviet bloc--and the political implications that would reach far beyond the Middle East. (7:27)) Finally, a strong U.S. policy is ineffective because Assad has built good will when necessary by intervening on behalf of Western hostages. This fact, combined with his secure power base at home and his close ties with Moscow, make diplomats wary of

criticizing him, and some even praise him as a "helpful partner" in Mideast negotiations. (7:26) For now, the U.S. wants to avoid getting out in front of Britain (in their actions against Syrian influence in terrorist activity). "It's not our job to go around the world punching every sponsor of state terrorism in the nose," says Michael Ledeen of the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, who adds: "Better to try something that will work." What that might be is undecided. (7:30)

While we are uncertain what to do in Syria, a positive anti-terrorist action was initiated to enhance the safety of U.S. citizens working in Libya.

Most of the Americans in Libya went there as refugees of the U.S. oil bust, technicians who could make good money in the desert working jobs that no longer existed at home. (24:19) Many of these Americans, when ordered to leave by the President, complained that Reagan was interfering with their lifestyle. Some refused to leave, claiming the President couldn't order them out and it was unconstitutional for him to do so. Scholars have voiced the same concern.

GETTING THE AMERICANS OUT OF LIBYA: WAS IT LEGAL?

When it comes to foreign affairs, the White House has considerable discretion. Just two years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a similar order restricting travel to Cuba, a 5-4 majority ruled nothing in the Constitution prohibited such limits invoked in the name of foreign policy. (24:19) The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (1977 federal law) gives a president the authority to "deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat ... to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States" by imposing limits on commercial dealings. (24:19) Although restrictions on travel are unconstitutional, by imposing limits on commercial dealings, the U.S. in effect made it illegal (constitutionally) to conduct any financial matters, including such things as paying rent and buying groceries. (24:19) What makes this new order different is that it carries with it both civil and criminal penalties for both individuals and corporations--up to 10 years imprisonment for individuals "willfully" violating the executive edict. (24:19)

As explained above, certain actions can be (and were) legally taken by the U.S. in response to states alleged to be sponsoring terrorism. However, another example of a Washington response was the April raid on Libya. This issue brings up a question to which many scholars seem to be seeking an answer.

IN BOMBING LIBYA, DIDN'T WE BECOME TERRORISTS OURSELVES?

According to Kenneth Jacobson, director of Middle Eastern Affairs of the Anti-Defamation League, the answer to this question lies in the distinction between what the terrorist seeks

to achieve and what those who counter terrorism are about. (12:20) He goes on to state that the terrorist is characterized by a deliberate attempt to harm civilians--whatever the motive, it is the innocent citizen who is particularly the target. The U.S. in Libya, however, did all in their power to avoid civilian casualties. (12:20) Intelligence seeks to determine where military targets are and military organizations seek ways to minimize non-military damage. There is, however, no guarantee that civilians will not be affected. If reasonable precautions are taken and there is reasonable efficiency, then it is appropriate to describe the action as self-defense. (12:20) Former Ambassador Oakley, in addressing the U.S. Conference of Mayors on June 16, 1986, echoed much the same thoughts when he stated (in reference to the Libya raid): "President Reagan's response was to invoke the right of any country to self-defense when attacked by another country." (11:4) Finally, Richard Falk, Albert G. Milbank professor of international law and practice at Princeton University, in referring to terrorists' "murder of innocent civilians" states that in such an event their tactics "legitimate repressive countermeasures." (8:888)

The final question is closely related to this one. Many scholars question whether a retaliatory response to terrorism is morally right, despite the possible legal sanction of such an act.

IS U.S. RETALIATION IN RESPONSE TO TERRORISM MORALLY RIGHT?

Clearly, what is morally right is extremely complicated and probably a matter of individual conjecture. Each person can be as right (or wrong) as the next. However, several influential Cabinet ministers, legislators, military officers, and scholars have provided their thoughts and insights regarding this issue. Secretary of State George Shultz, speaking at a 1984 meeting of international officials and experts in Washington that explored the question of just what could be done to stop terrorism, stated:

A purely passive defense does not provide enough of a deterrent to terrorism and the states that sponsor it. It is time to think long, hard, and seriously about more active means of defense--defense through preventive or pre-emptive actions against terrorist groups before they strike.... Experience has taught us that one of the best deterrents to terrorism is the certainty that swift and sure measures will be taken against those who engage in it. Clearly there are complicated moral issues here. But there should be no doubt of the democracies' moral right, indeed duty, to defend themselves. (19:50)

Former U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick agrees, despite some evidently contrary beliefs of the U.N. General Assembly. At the same Washington conference, she stated that "It [the U.N. General Assembly] has consistently condemned countries for attempting to defend themselves against terrorist violence.

The distinction between legitimate and illegitimate use of force has not so much been blurred as stood on its head." (19:50)

At the same conference, author Paul Johnson (Modern Times) espoused in detail that the major civilized powers must all work together against terrorism in a "coordinated, well-financed, informal and secret effort to discover and exchange information" about all aspects of terrorists everywhere. He concluded by saying: "For the terrorist, there can be no hiding places. The terrorist must never be allowed to feel safe anywhere in the world. A terrorist kept constantly on the defensive is an ineffective terrorist." (19:51)

Benjamin Netanyahu, author of *Terrorism: How The West Can Win* (Farrar, Straus, & Giroux), indicates there is both a practical and moral basis for not ruling out a military response. He states that in practical terms, an inflexible rule regarding not risking injury to civilians automatically rules out military action. "In moral terms," he adds, "an absolute prohibition on civilian casualties today condemns to death or injury many future victims. Terrorism, undeterred, will inevitably increase." (19:50) He concludes by stating, "The only sensible policy for attacked governments, then, is a refusal to yield and a readiness to apply force." (19:51)

As terrorism has increased over the years, so has the interest of many academics. Many scholars have several general concerns regarding terrorism. Their major concerns, however, are not specific questions, but are related to the overall approach(es) taken in studying terrorism issues. Most argue that their views need to be heard. For example, both Martha Crenshaw (associate professor of government at Wesleyan University) and Ted Robert Gurr (professor of political science at the University of Colorado) agree that the study of terrorism is in its infancy and several topics need to be expanded. (23:6) Some of the subjects they say require more research are:

The assumption that giving in to terrorists' demands stimulates more terrorism; the identification of the groups that have the highest potential for resorting to terrorism; the factors that cause terrorist organizations to endure or die out, to continue using terrorism or adopt other tactics; the psychology of individual terrorists or terrorist organizations. (23:6)

Yonah Alexander, a member of the research staff at Georgetown's Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the editor of the journal *Terrorism*, emphasizes the need for academic support in studying terrorism. "Academe," he says, "insures a continuity in approaching terrorism that the government, with its turnover in personnel, cannot provide." (23:12)

Scholars generally agree that government officials do not listen enough and the policy makers are more concerned with ideas on short-term responses to the problem rather than with insights

into its causes. (23:12) With that in mind, attention will now be focused on what appear to be concerns of the military in positions to affect the decisions of these policy makers.

Chapter Four

MILITARY AUDIENCE

The Administration has been hard at work unilaterally to improve its ability to act against terrorism. The antiterrorism legislation passed by Congress in late 1984 was put into practice with the issuing of arrest warrants and extradition requests as well as the posting of rewards for hijackers and killers of TWA Flight 847 and the Achille Lauro cruise ship. Thus, the Department of Justice and the FBI became more directly involved in investigating and preparing to prosecute terrorist crimes against Americans abroad. This action also has the effect of emphasizing that terrorists are not some kind of romantic freedom fighters but are vicious criminals. Additional U.S. legislation along these same lines is pending, as is a new U.S.-U.K. extradition treaty which would treat all terrorists as criminals. (11:11) This proposed bilateral agreement is closely related to the first question.

DOES THE U.S. ANTI/COUNTER-TERRORISM PROGRAM HAVE ANY INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT?

Former Ambassador Oakley, in his February 19, 1986 statement before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism - Senate Judiciary Committee, addressed this country's concern regarding European efforts against terrorism. He indicated there was no question in his mind but that other governments in Europe and elsewhere share "a growing recognition of the extreme gravity of the [terrorist] threat and the need to take action." (11:7)

In January 1986, the European Communities' foreign ministers met and discussed terrorism at length and finally issued a positive statement. They announced a decision not to export arms or other military equipment to countries which support terrorism, a pledge not to undercut steps other states have taken to deal with terrorism, and the formation of a permanent working group to make future recommendations regarding treatment of/response to terrorism. (11:7)

Former Ambassador Borg, in his February 19, 1986 statement before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science/International Operations - House Foreign Affairs Committee, supported Ambassador Oakley's assessment. Ambassador Borg stated: "We have found the [U.S.] antiterrorism assistance program to be a very effective policy tool for stimulating general interest in other countries in general cooperation and in stimulating support for specific U.S. policy concerns." (11:8) "To date," he added, "32 countries have participated in some aspect of the antiterrorism assistance program ... there is no doubt that there is a higher level of awareness in many countries

of the dangers of international terrorism and a greater willingness to take effective actions because of the [U.S.] antiterrorism assistance program." (11:8)

Finally, John Whitehead, Deputy Secretary of State, also commented on this issue. In his April 22, 1986 statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, he indicated, "Some of our European allies did not provide the support [referring to the Libya raid] we would have liked to see." (4:80) He did, however, agree with the status of the overall terrorism program described by Ambassadors Oakley and Borg. Mr Whitehead, in this regard, stated the following:

There is hope again for cooperation in the economic summit context and for cooperative arrangements with the European Community. Progress is now underway, but we must guard against governments reverting to old ways of doing business after the shock of a terrorist incident has worn off. Our task is to maintain the current momentum until effective international structures are in place to prevent terrorism. (4:80)

Some European nations' support of the April 1986 Libya raid was obvious. Other nations may have shown support just by their silence. However, that U.S. raid did take place in Africa--and not the backyard of one of our allies. Would our allies have reacted the same way if U.S. military force was used in their homeland? That brings up the next question, one of our military response abroad.

WHAT ARE THE U.S. OPTIONS TO COMBAT TERRORISM ABROAD?

This question has to be approached from two different angles. First, protection of personnel from terrorism will be discussed. Second, the military role/rights in combatting terrorism will also be explored. (This question is closely linked to the moral issue discussed in the last chapter.)

Over the past several years, the U.S. has put great emphasis (and funds) on hardening potential terrorist targets. These programs are well and good for facilities and equipment, but what about personnel? The words of Ambassador Laingen (ranking diplomat among the 52 American hostages held by Iran, and a staff member of the National Defense University) expressed this same concern. He stated, "I am not at all convinced that these fortified places do that much to thwart terrorism, not least because in the business of diplomacy and certainly in the peacetime military one has to be out among the populace of the place in which assigned." (14:9) Ambassador Laingen went on to express some of his views on what the U.S. ought to be doing. He indicated we need to strengthen our capacity, psychologically, as individuals to cope in the real world made up of this sort of protection, thus strengthening our awareness and also strengthening our appreciation of the fact that it could

happen to you. No particular individual is immune. (14:9)
The Department of Defense (DoD) obviously agrees.

Part of the reassignment (to overseas locations) package for senior military personnel is a pamphlet that provides a number of tips on how to protect yourself, and your family, against possible terrorist actions. The pamphlet even includes a sort of detailed checklist on broad areas such as: house, home, and family; ground transportation security; traveling defensively by air; and hostage situations. (28:1) Simplified, the DoD guidance, which parallels Ambassador Laingen's, can be presented in three easily understood rules: keep a low profile; be unpredictable; remain vigilant. (28:10) While compliance with these guidelines cannot ensure individuals will be exempt from terrorist attacks, it will enhance their chances of not becoming the target.

The military's role/rights in combatting terrorism are not quite as clear-cut as the individual's options, especially regarding terrorism committed abroad. Professor John Moore, Director of the Centers for Oceans Law, and Law and National Security at the University of Virginia, had the following to say on the matter of the military's right to combat terrorism:

Although the United Nation's Charter rule is that a state cannot use force aggressively as a means of change in international life, still a state is entitled to respond against aggressive attack, whether that is a direct attack using armies on the march, or whether it is a low intensity conflict or irregular or guerrilla or terrorist attack. (18:11)

Benjamin Netanyahu supports this assertion. In discussing a hostage situation abroad, he indicates that the government of the country on whose soil the incident occurs has the responsibility for securing the hostages' release. However, he adds, if that "government cannot or will not undertake forcibly to end the hostage crisis, it forfeits a certain measure of jurisdiction. The country whose nationals (or plane or ship) are held hostage has the right to act when the host country refuses to do so." (19:52) This was the case in the Entebbe raid--Uganda took no action and the French, who owned the aircraft, chose not to intervene militarily. Because most of the passengers were Israeli, the right to act then passed to Israel.

Our potential response in Europe is drastically constrained by the political, economic, and close diplomatic ties with our allies. We will not handle an incident, say in France, like we did in the Libya raid--it's two completely different situations. Our allies, for instance, don't have either a record of sponsoring terrorism or a history of inaction when a forceful response seems warranted. Not only that, but they have taken firm appropriate (military at times) stands against terrorist acts. For example, "Italy, Turkey, Germany, Great Britain, Spain, and other nations have adopted tough laws, granted increased powers to the police and trained elite anti-terrorist

forces." (25:7) Some of these forces (Italy in the Dozier case, Britain in the Falklands, Germany in the Lufthansa airliner hostage rescue, and of course, Israel in the Entebbe raid) have well developed hostage rescue capabilities that appear more suitable and effective than our own (failed Iranian hostage mission). The spectacular successes of our allied friends contrasted with our response effort in Iran, give rise to the final question attributed to this particular audience.

WHAT IS THE STATUS OF OUR COUNTERTERRORISM FORCE(S)?

Low intensity conflict, which among other things includes terrorism, cannot be countered by using normal conventional forces and military operational methods. Some specially trained and equipped forces are necessary to operate effectively in this new (for the U.S.) environment. The U.S. does have some of these type forces (Special Forces) available, but it is not at all clear just how effective they are.

Admiral William Crowe, head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, strongly asserts our forces are ready. When asked if he thought our ability was adequate when it comes to counterterrorism, he replied, "In 1981 our counterterrorism capability was extremely limited. Now we probably have the best in the world." (21:47) Senator William Cohen, Senate Intelligence Committee, however, does not agree with the Admiral's assessment. "The United States," the Senator said, "is ill-equipped to deal with the problems of terrorism and guerrilla warfare." (17:36) A Pentagon task force, in an internal report made public in October 1986, seemed to support Senator Cohen. It reported that "we execute our activities poorly, and we lack the ability to sustain operations." (17:36)

In defense of our programs, top Pentagon officials maintain the problem is not with our Special Forces, but rather the fact that hijackings and terror raise sovereignty issues. "Foreign governments, sensitive to charges of American meddling in volatile regions, are simply reluctant to allow the U.S. to station counterterrorist units on their soil, close to likely scenes of conflict." (17:36,38)

No one seems to disagree that Special Forces are essential to combat terrorism and wage low-intensity warfare. (17:38) The problem seems to be whether and/or how to go about accomplishing that objective. Congress is in the midst of mandating some changes regarding Special Operations Forces, in hopes of increasing their effectiveness. The Department of Defense is in the process of complying with these mandates. Admiral Crowe, meanwhile, indicated what he saw as the problems of Special Forces. He said:

They need more joint training, more cooperation between the services and a central doctrine. They need more exercises working with unified commands and theater forces. They require increased airlift capa-

bility, which we're working hard to rectify. And they need more visibility in Washington. (21:47)

Here, Senator Cohen agrees: "It has been six years since the tragedy in the deserts of Iran, and the U.S. still doesn't have the capability to perform such a mission." (17:39)

Are our Forces ready? How long before they are ready? Special Forces appear to have come a long way, with much further to go. Today's battlefields are the pavements of airports and continued random worldwide terrorist activities. This nation needs effective Special Forces to combat incidents in this new battlefield, but there is no clear consensus that they are ready. The important, and as yet unanswered, question still remains: How much longer can we afford to wait?

Chapter Five

CONCLUSION

Despite the worldwide prominence of terrorism, the Western nations seem to have, thus far, been spared the worst of it. This is so, partially, because terrorism "has not succeeded in creating a climate of repression in Western nations because terrorists have failed to create sufficient fear, and the authorities have not responded by enacting repressive measures." (6:20) Even so, Americans across the board have some deep-riding concerns regarding terrorism. The exact nature of their questions may be different, but individuals from high school, college, and the military all have personal concerns of one sort or another. Some of those issues have been explored in the previous three chapters. There are, obviously, many concerns that were not addressed. Additionally, terrorism and this nation's reaction/response to it is certainly a very dynamic situation. What is an issue today may not be tomorrow.

Five questions, that appear to be current concerns of the high school audience, were discussed in Chapter Two. From that discussion, a short briefing script was prepared (Appendix A) for use in presenting terrorism to that particular audience. The primary focus of this audience was whether the continental United States was at risk of terrorist incidents like Europe and the Middle East. Additionally, they questioned how terrorism is "supported", including manipulation of the media, and whether terrorists were effective in accomplishing what they set out to achieve.

The college audience, in a series of five questions, appears concerned with the nation's objectives in our treatment of Libya and Syria. Further, they questioned the legality and morality of this nation's responses to terrorism. From the discussion exploring the five questions in Chapter Three, a short briefing script was prepared (Appendix B) for use in presenting terrorist issues to the college level audience.

The final briefing script (Appendix C) was prepared from the issues and concerns brought out in Chapter Four. This audience, the senior military member, appeared to be primarily concerned with the nation's antiterrorism and counterterrorism options and capabilities. The support of our allies (individual nations, the United Nations, and other international organizations) regarding our counterterrorism proposals was also questioned. The military's role in combatting terrorism is politically (both domestically and internationally) constrained and consequently not at all clear--a major concern of this audience.

Terrorism is alive and well. Many countries have unilaterally and bilaterally taken positive action to counter

the terrorist threat. Additionally, even the United Nations has taken a stand. The U.N. General Assembly "unequivocally condemns as criminal, all acts, methods and practices of terrorism wherever and by whomever committed." (26:52) Also, the U.N. Security Council has "unanimously gone on record in condemning all acts of hostage taking." (27:53) Still, terrorism persists. It has been with us a long time, and there is no reason to believe it will soon subside. As a "free nation," we must work in the international environment to develop an antiterrorism policy, "the actions of which would be of such consequence that terrorists or their sponsors would be physically disabled or psychologically dissuaded from performing the terrorist act". (29:9) Such a policy would go a long way toward making us a truly "free nation."

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: HIGH SCHOOL AUDIENCE

APPENDIX B: COLLEGE AUDIENCE

APPENDIX C: SENIOR MILITARY AUDIENCE

APPENDIX A
HIGH SCHOOL AUDIENCE

TERRORISM IS DISTURBING NOT JUST EMOTIONALLY AND MORALLY, BUT INTELLECTUALLY AS WELL. (22:62) IT IS CONSTANTLY IN THE MEDIA. HOWEVER, USUALLY TERRORIST INCIDENTS OCCUR IN EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST, REMOTE FROM THE UNITED STATES.

COULD THEY HAPPEN HERE?

SECURITY EXPERTS SAY YES. DR. KUPPERMANN AND SEVERAL U.S. INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS AGREE. (3:27) THEY INDICATE WE HAVE BECOME THE ULTIMATE CHALLENGE FOR EVERY TERRORIST AND WE'RE JUST NOT READY. DR. KUPPERMANN GOES ON TO SAY THAT OUR TELECOMMUNICATIONS, OIL PIPELINES, AND ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS ARE EXTREMELY VULNERABLE. (3:27) THE FBI, HOWEVER, DISAGREES WITH THESE EXPERTS AND STATES THE CONCERN FOR TERRORISM OUTDISTANCES THE REALITY. (20:20)

OUR SOCIETY'S GREATEST STRENGTH, ITS OPENNESS, MAKES THIS NATION DANGEROUSLY VULNERABLE TO TERRORISTS. YET, WE'VE BEEN REASONABLY SAFE FROM THE SORT OF INCIDENTS PROMINENT ELSEWHERE.

WHY HASN'T IT HAPPENED HERE?

SECURITY SPECIALISTS WORRY ABOUT THE SKIMPY SECURITY AT OUR NATION'S PUBLIC BUILDINGS, MILITARY BASES, POWER STATIONS, AND WATER SUPPLIES. AND THEY POINT OUT THE VIRTUAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF THE FBI KEEPING TRACK OF POTENTIAL TERRORISTS. THE PRIMARY REASONS FOR OUR RELATIVE SECURITY ARE (2:21):

- POTENTIAL TERRORISTS MUST TRAVEL FROM THE MIDDLE EAST, FOR INSTANCE, FAR FROM THEIR BASES AND SUPPLY NETWORKS.
- FOREIGN EXTREMISTS FIND FEW SUPPORTERS HERE.
- THE FBI HAS DRAMATICALLY STEPPED UP THEIR EFFORTS TO STOP TERRORIST GROUPS.
- HISTORICALLY, AMERICANS ARE RARELY DRIVEN TO REACT THROUGH VIOLENCE BECAUSE OF POLITICAL OR EMOTIONAL FEELINGS.

IS THE NEWS MEDIA GIVING TERRORISM TOO MUCH COVERAGE?

PROFESSOR LAQUER AND MR NETANYAHU BOTH AGREE THE TERRORISTS' ACCESS TO MEDIA IS INDISPENSABLE. (15:52, 19:48) IN RESPONSE TO THIS SORT OF THINKING, A NEW PUBLIC OPINION POLL RATED THE NEWS MEDIA'S COVERAGE OF TERRORISM. THIS POLL INDICATES THAT 60% OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC THINKS THE MEDIA GIVES TERRORISTS TOO MUCH COVERAGE. (10:74) BUT, 77% ALSO SAID TERRORIST INCIDENTS WOULD OCCUR EVEN IF THE MEDIA DID NOT COVER THEM SO EXTENSIVELY. (10:74)

THERE SEEMS TO BE CONSIDERABLE CONJECTURE WHETHER TERRORISTS ARE ACTUALLY EFFECTIVE IN ACHIEVING THEIR OBJECTIVES. THERE IS, HOWEVER, NO DOUBT THAT SEVERAL NATIONS DO SUPPORT TERRORISTS AND TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS.

HOW DO NATIONS SUPPORT TERRORISM?

- MONEY. LIBYA, IT IS KNOWN, HAS SUPPLIED MILLIONS OF DOLLARS TO PALESTINIAN, LATIN AMERICAN, AND EUROPEAN TERRORIST GROUPS. THE USSR, SYRIA, CUBA, AND NICARAGUA HAVE ALSO FUNNELED VAST QUANTITIES OF FUNDS TO SUPPORT TERRORISM. (13:13)
- TRAINING. TERRORISTS FROM SOME 20 COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN

TRAINED IN CAMPS (STAFFED BY CUBA, LIBYA, AND THE PLO) IN
IRAN AND NICARAGUA. (13:13)

- FINALLY, TERRORISTS HAVE ALSO RECEIVED WEAPONS, SAFE
HOUSES, INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, AND SIGNIFICANT
ENCOURAGEMENT. (13:13) ALL OF THESE SERVE TO SUPPORT
TERRORISM EITHER MORALLY OR PHYSICALLY.

IN CONCLUSION, TERRORISM HAS NOT BEEN EFFECTIVE IN CREATING
A CLIMATE OF REPRESSION IN WESTERN NATIONS BECAUSE TERRORISTS
HAVE FAILED TO CREATE SUFFICIENT FEAR, AND THE AUTHORITIES
HAVE NOT RESPONDED BY ENACTING REPRESSIVE MEASURES. (6:20)
TERRORISTS SEEM UNABLE TO ACCEPT THE FACT THAT THE RESPONSES
OF A GOVERNMENT MAY ACTUALLY REFLECT THE DESIRES OF THE PEOPLE.

APPENDIX B

COLLEGE AUDIENCE

OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS, THE U.S. HAS CHARGED LIBYA WITH VARIOUS STATE SPONSORED TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. THIS NATION EVEN PERFORMED A MILITARY AIR STRIKE IN LIBYAN TERRITORY.

WHAT IS OUR GOAL REGARDING TERRORISM AND LIBYA?

DONALD FORTIER, THE NO.2 OFFICIAL ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF, WAS THE MAIN ARCHITECT OF OUR POLICY TOWARD LIBYA, AND IT INCLUDES ALL OF THE FOLLOWING (1:16):

- PUT QADDAFI ON THE SPOT INTERNATIONALLY.
- KEEP PRESSING OUR ALLIES TO TAKE A TOUGHER STAND.
- TURN THE OIL WEAPON BACK ON LIBYA. (USING OUR ECONOMIC MUSCLE, WE COULD USE THE PRESENT OIL GLUT AS A WEAPON TO INFLUENCE THE BEHAVIOR OF LIBYA.)
- BOOST QADDAFI'S ENEMIES, WITHIN LIBYA, NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES, AND THE LIBYAN EXILE COMMUNITY.

WE HAVE READ AND HEARD MANY ACCOUNTS OF QADDAFI'S RHETORIC AND OUR REACTION TO IT. EVEN THOUGH THERE HAS BEEN MUCH MORE NEWS COVERAGE OF LIBYAN SPONSORED TERRORISM, SYRIA HAS A RECORD OF SUPPORTING TERRORISM AS WELL.

WHAT IS OUR GOAL REGARDING TERRORISM AND SYRIA?

THIS ANSWER IS NOT AT ALL CLEAR. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE GENERAL POLICY OF SPONSORING TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN WESTERN EUROPE

IS DONE WITH ASSAD'S APPROVAL AND PROBABLY HIS INITIATIVE. (7:27) CONSEQUENTLY, LONDON HAS TAKEN ACTION BY BREAKING RELATIONS, BUT OTHER COUNTRIES SEEM RELUCTANT TO ACT. (7:27) WASHINGTON HAS ALL BUT RULED OUT A MILITARY OPTION (SIMILAR TO THE LIBYAN RAID). THIS IS PARTLY BECAUSE OF THE STRENGTH OF SYRIA'S AIR DEFENSES. (7:27) ADDITIONALLY, SYRIA HAS EVEN BEEN PRAISED AS A HELPFUL PARTNER IN MIDEAST NEGOTIATIONS AND IN INTERVENING ON BEHALF OF WESTERN HOSTAGES. FINALLY, BECAUSE OF THEIR CLOSE TIES WITH MOSCOW, SYRIA HAS THEIR ENEMIES A BIT WARY OF TRYING ANYTHING. (7:27) THERE JUST IS NO CONCERTED WESTERN (OR U.S.) POLICY OR EFFORT REGARDING TERRORISM AND SYRIA.

IS U.S. RETALIATION IN RESPONSE TO TERRORISM MORALLY RIGHT?

SECRETARY SHULTZ INDICATED THERE SHOULD BE NO DOUBT OF THE DEMOCRACIES' MORAL RIGHT, INDEED DUTY, TO DEFEND THEMSELVES. (19:50) MR NETANYAHU AGREES THE ONLY SENSIBLE POLICY FOR ATTACKED GOVERNMENTS IS A REFUSAL TO YIELD AND A READINESS TO APPLY FORCE. (19:51) PAUL JOHNSON, AUTHOR OF MODERN TIMES, SUPPORTS THAT ASSERTION. HE STATED THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO HIDING PLACE FOR TERRORISTS; THEY MUST NEVER FEEL SAFE ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD. (19:51) MANY OTHER CABINET MINISTERS, LEGISTATORS, MILITARY OFFICERS, AND SCHOLARS ALSO AGREE. HOWEVER, THE U.N. HAS CONSISTENTLY CONDEMNED COUNTRIES FOR ATTEMPTING TO DEFEND THEMSELVES AGAINST TERRORIST VIOLENCE. (19:50) THIS IS JUST ONE ISSUE, OF MANY, SURROUNDING TERRORISM THAT SCHOLARS SAY REQUIRES MORE RESEARCH. THEY WANT TO BE INVOLVED IN THAT RESEARCH, AND YONAH ALEXANDER (EDITOR OF THE JOURNAL TERRORISM) ALSO EMPHASIZES THAT NEED. THEY ALL GENERALLY AGREE THAT GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS DO

NOT LISTEN ENOUGH AND THE POLICY MAKERS ARE MORE CONCERNED WITH
IDEAS ON SHORT-TERM RESPONSES TO THE PROBLEM RATHER THAN WITH
INSIGHTS INTO ITS CAUSES. (23:12)

APPENDIX C

SENIOR MILITARY AUDIENCE

THE ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN HARD AT WORK UNILATERALLY TO IMPROVE ITS ABILITY TO ACT AGAINST TERRORISM. ANTITERRORISM LEGISLATION WAS EVEN PASSED IN LATE 1984. ADDITIONAL U.S. LEGISLATION ALONG THESE SAME LINES IS PENDING, AS IS A NEW U.S.-U.K. EXTRADITION TREATY.

DOES THE U.S. ANTI/COUNTER-TERRORISM PROGRAM HAVE ANY INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT?

FORMER AMBASSADOR OAKLEY INDICATED THERE WAS NO QUESTION IN HIS MIND THAT OTHER GOVERNMENTS IN EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE SHARE A GROWING RECOGNITION OF THE EXTREME GRAVITY OF THE TERRORIST THREAT AND THE NEED TO TAKE ACTION. (11:7) FORMER AMBASSADOR BORG AGREES. HE STATED THAT 32 COUNTRIES HAD PARTICIPATED IN SOME ASPECT OF THE U.S. ANTITERRORISM ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. (11:8) THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES' FOREIGN MINISTERS ALSO ISSUED A POSITIVE STATEMENT REGARDING TERRORISM. (11:7) DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE WHITEHEAD, AFTER THE LIBYA RAID, INDICATED THERE WAS HOPE FOR COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY BUT OUR TASK WAS TO MAINTAIN THE CURRENT MOMENTUM UNTIL EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL STRUCTURES WERE IN PLACE TO PREVENT TERRORISM. (4:80)

WHAT ARE U.S. OPTIONS TO COMBAT TERRORISM ABROAD?

AMBASSADOR LAINGEN INDICATED WE NEED TO STRENGTHEN OUR CAPACITY,

PSYCHOLOGICALLY, TO COPE IN THE REAL WORLD OF PROTECTION AGAINST TERRORISM, THUS STRENGTHENING OUR AWARENESS AND OUR APPRECIATION OF THE FACT THAT IT COULD HAPPEN TO YOU. (14:9) THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) AGREES AND EVEN PROVIDES PERSONNEL CHECKLISTS (ESPECIALLY PRIOR TO OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENTS) FOR ENHANCING THEIR SAFETY. (28:1) THE DOD RULES, SIMPLIFIED: KEEP A LOW PROFILE, BE UNPREDICTABLE, AND REMAIN VIGILANT. (28:10) THE MILITARY'S ROLE/RIGHTS IN COMBATTING TERRORISM, HOWEVER, ARE NOT AS CLEAR-CUT AS THE INDIVIDUAL'S OPTIONS. PROFESSOR MOORE DECLARES A STATE IS ENTITLED TO RESPOND AGAINST AGGRESSIVE ATTACK OF ANY SORT. (18:11) MR NETANYAHU SUPPORTS THAT ASSERTION. IN SPEAKING ABOUT A HOSTAGE SITUATION, HE STATED THAT IF THE COUNTRY ON WHOSE SOIL THE SITUATION OCCURS WILL NOT OR CANNOT UNDERTAKE FORCIBLY TO SECURE THE HOSTAGES' RELEASE, THEN THAT RIGHT PASSES TO THE COUNTRY WHOSE NATIONALS (OR PLANE OR SHIP) ARE HELD HOSTAGE. (25:52) HOWEVER, CLOSE DIPLOMATIC, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL TIES BETWEEN THE U.S. AND WESTERN EUROPE DRASTICALLY CONSTRAIN ANY POTENTIAL RESPONSE. ADDITIONALLY, EUROPEAN ANTI-TERRORIST FORCES HAVE A MUCH BETTER TRACK RECORD THAN THEIR U.S. COUNTERPARTS. (THIS CAN BE SEEN BY THE SUCCESSES OF: ITALY IN THE DOZIER CASE, BRITAIN IN THE FALKLANDS, GERMANY IN THE LUFTHANSA AIRLINER HOSTAGE RESCUE, AND ISRAEL AT ENTEBBE. WE DIDN'T FARE AS WELL IN THE IRANIAN HOSTAGE RESCUE ATTEMPT.)

WHAT IS THE STATUS OF OUR COUNTERTERRORISM FORCE(S)?

ADMIRAL CROWE SAYS THEY'RE PROBABLY THE BEST IN THE WORLD. (21:47) SENATOR COHEN, HOWEVER, SAYS WE'RE ILL-EQUIPPED TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEMS OF TERRORISM. (21:36) HE POINTS TO THE FAILED IRANIAN

HOSTAGE RESCUE ATTEMPT AND STATES THE U.S. STILL DOESN'T HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO PERFORM SUCH A MISSION. (21:39) UNDERSTANDABLY, TOP PENTAGON OFFICIALS DISAGREE WITH THE SENATOR. (21:36,38) THERE IS NO DISAGREEMENT WE NEED SPECIAL FORCES TO COMBAT TERRORISM, BUT PLENTY OF DISAGREEMENT ON THEIR CAPABILITIES. HERE, ADMIRAL CROWE INDICATED THE NEED FOR MORE JOINT TRAINING AND INCREASED AIRLIFT CAPABILITY. (21:47) THIS NATION NEEDS EFFECTIVE SPECIAL FORCES TO OPERATE IN THE NEW BATTLEFIELDS (THE PAVEMENTS OF AIRPORTS AND CONTINUED WORLDWIDE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES), BUT AS YET NO CLEAR CONSENSUS EXISTS ON HOW MUCH LONGER WE CAN AFFORD TO WAIT, BEFORE WE CANNOT AFFORD TO WAIT.

END

6-87

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